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One of the main results of the literature on the eﬀects of uncertainty on trade
states that uncertainty should not matter in the presence of well developed for-
ward markets. Empirical studies, however, do not support this result. We derive
the demand for forward cover in a small open economy with terms of trade un-
certainty. Adopting a standard and more realistic decision structure than the
one usually used in this literature, we ﬁnd that risk averse agents will not buy
forwards at an unbiased price. Agents treat forward contracts as an asset rather
than as an insurance. This is the reason why, when calibrating the model, only
17% of imports are covered by forwards.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: F00, F30, G10
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
International trade in goods is characterized by uncertainty. Common sense and economic
theory suggest that exporters, importers and households should try to hedge against this
uncertainty. Natural candidates for hedging instruments are future and forward contracts.
In fact, Ethier (1973) introduced the separation theorem and the full hedge theorem under
exchange rate uncertainty, showing that demand for forward contracts perfectly compensates
uncertainty. Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha (1985) and Kawai and Zilcha (1986) additionally
discussed price level uncertainty, obtaining the same results. Recently, this strong result
has been subject to some qualiﬁcations. Viaene and Zilcha (1998), for example, consider
additionally output and cost uncertainty and ﬁnd that under this setup full-double hedge
and separation fail to hold.
Adam-Müller (2000) introduces inﬂation risk which cannot be hedged away and ﬁnds that
full-hedge and separation break down if the two sources of risk in the model are not statisti-
cally independent. Market structure issues have been addressed as well, examples are Eldor
and Zilcha (1987) and Broll and Zilcha (1992).
The empirical literature, though spares, does not support the strong theoretical predic-
tions of the early literature. As Carse, Williamson and Wood (1980) and others have shown,
only roughly one-third of the value of international trade is covered by forward contracts.
Even equity ﬂows are only poorly hedged. According to Hau and Rey (2003), only 8% of
US equity holdings abroad are hedged against exchange rate risks. Furthermore, there exists
a lively debate in the empirical literature as to whether exchange rate volatility depresses
trade levels or not. This debate is related to the issue of demand for forwards in that often
t h ea r g u m e n ti sm a d et h a ta sl o n ga sa g e n t sh a v ea c c e s st ow e l ld e v e l o p e df o r w a r dm a r k e t s ,
the uncertainty should not matter. Strikingly, the evidence is rather mixed and seems to be
independent of the existence of well developed forward markets. A survey on the empirical
evidence is provided by Coté (1994) and Wei (1998) discusses the underlying causes.
This paper reconciles empirical ﬁndings with theoretical considerations. We show that
by allowing agents to optimally choose their consumption bundle after resolution of price
uncertainty - which is in contrast to the literature on forwards but standard in e.g. macro
models with uncertainty - forward contracts resemble normal uncertain assets rather than
insurance contracts. As forward contracts tend to have lower returns than e.g. physical
capital, agents do not hold many of those assets and trade ﬂows are only poorly hedged.
We build an inﬁnite horizon small open economy model where one good is domestically
produced with capital and labour, another good is imported. Both goods are consumed.
Capital is accumulated and risk averse households hedge optimally against terms of trade
uncertainty.2 One forward contract allows (and obliges) them to buy one import good in the
next period at a ﬁxed price pY.
We ﬁrst study the determinants of demand for forwards. We show that the exogenous
internationally given forward price pY is the crucial determinant of demand for forwards.
When this forward price equals the expected price of the import good, i.e. when the forward
price is unbiased, risk averse households do not want to buy any forwards - they would
actually want to sell forwards. When the forward price equals the price at which risk neutral
households would be indiﬀerent, risk averse households demand a positive amount of forward
contracts.
Risk averse households want to sell forwards at unbiased prices as their utility function is
concave in consumption levels. With consumption levels optimally chosen ex-post, indirect
utility functions of individuals exhibit convexity in prices, though still concavity in expen-
2diture. As expenditure is a function of prices as well, overall, the indirect utility function
exhibits convexity in prices and households are actually (price-) risk lovers. Positive demand
therefore requires a price that is suﬃciently low, e.g. the price oﬀered by risk neutral house-
holds. Intuitively, we could think of the risk averse households as not willing to commit
themselves to a consumption decision when faced with price uncertainty. They do not want
to give away the option to adjust their consumption bundles.
We then calibrate the model by using realistic and reasonable parameter values. We
ﬁnd that between 10% and 20% of international trade is covered by forward contracts. The
low ratios cited in the empirical literature are therefore not surprising and may reﬂect the
curvature of utility functions of utility maximizing households. Partial equilibrium setups
or setups focusing on risk neutral ﬁrms should therefore be extended to take this aspect into
consideration.
We are not the ﬁrst that ﬁnd that full-hedge theorem and separation theorem do not
hold. As argued above, there is a substantial literature that ﬁnds that these two theorems
will not hold as soon as certain conditions are violated. Our result, however, is derived in a
completely diﬀerent manner. The crucial point is the decision structure of our agents. The
standard approach assumes that all decisions are made before the resolution of uncertainty.
In contrast, we employ an alternative decision rule, which is commonly used in macro models
with uncertainty. In the ﬁrst period, still before resolution of uncertainty, the agents decide
upon their level of hedging and in the second, after the uncertainty is resolved, the agents
actually make their consumption decision. Following this approach, agents will never be
able to eliminate uncertainty from their budgets and hence are faced with a trade-oﬀ.A s
a consequence, risk averse agents will never buy forward cover under unbiased insurance
prices.
2T h e m o d e l
Technologies
We study a small open economy that produces one good X that is internationally traded.
It imports a foreign consumption good Y which is not domestically produced. Domestic
production requires capital K and labour L, which are non-tradable,
Xt = X (Kt,L t). (1)
Time is discrete and variables are indexed by t. The production function X (.) has the stan-
dard neoclassical properties. Firms produce under perfect competition and factor rewards
wL
t and wK










The number of units of the import good to be exchanged for one unit of the export good,
i.e. international terms of trade pX
t /pY
t at a point in time t, are exogenously given to the
economy and random. Before any trade in t takes place, prices for period t become common








τ for τ>tis common knowledge. In what follows, we choose X as numeraire and







3One can therefore think of the price of the domestic good as a deterministic price and of the
price of the foreign good as stochastic.
Domestic output X from the production process (1) is used for domestic consumption
CX
t ,e x p o r t sXE





t + It. (3)
Letting δ capture depreciation, capital grows according to
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It. (4)
In addition to producing the good Y, foreign agents oﬀer forward contracts. At trans-
action costs of χ ≥ 0 per unit to be paid in t, domestic agents can buy forward contracts
from foreign agents. Thus, foreign agents agree in t to sell in t +1one unit of the foreign
good at the exogenous internationally given price pY.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt oﬁxing in t next
periods terms of trade at pX/pY. When forward contracts of total volume Dt are signed,
foreign agents agree to sell Dt units of good Y at pY in t +1 . Domestic buyers commit to
buy in t +1at this price, irrespective of the realization of pY
t+1.3
Households
The horizon of the economy is inﬁn i t e .A g e n t si nt h i se c o n o m yl i v ef o rt w op e r i o d s .T h e y
work in the ﬁrst period of their life and consume in the second period. Consumption in the
second period comprises both the domestically produced good and the foreign good.
Preferences and budget constraints. The utility function of households is given by
v = v(u(CX,C Y)),
where u(CX,C Y) is some homothetic utility function and v(.) d e t e r m i n e st h ed e g r e eo fr i s k










, 1 ≥ σ>0. (6)
Note that the utility function (5) displays risk aversion towards the consumption levels.
Risk aversion in total consumption expenditure is given for 0 <σ<1, risk neutrality in
consumption expenditure would be represented by σ =1 .
A household’s ﬁrst period budget constraint equates labor income with savings and trans-
action costs for ﬁnancial contracts Dt,4
wt = st + χDt. (7)
Savings are used to buy capital goods st/pX. There is the implicit assumption of a market in
which today’s old, being the owners of the capital stock sell it to today’s young in exchange
for consumption good X, which in turn constitutes the wage of today’s young. The sum over
all individual savings equal the current capital stock (i.e. after depreciation) plus additional
aggregate investment,
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It =
st
pXL. (8)
4In the second period, households use all of their wealth and other income for ﬁnancing
consumption expenditure et+1. End of second period wealth amounts to pX (1 − δ) st
pX =
(1 − δ)Kt+1. Factor rewards for wealth amount to pX ∂Xt+1
∂Kt+1
st
























and savings st were replaced by using the ﬁrst period budget constraint (7).
The second period budget constraint (9) nicely shows that payoﬀs ¡
pY
t+1 − pY¢
Dt from forward contracts are positive and therefore a second period source of
income when the price pY
t+1 of good Y is suﬃciently high relative to its exogenous price pY
speciﬁed one period before. Forward contracts imply a loss in the case of low price of good
Y. Of course, bad terms of trade shocks leading to income and good terms of trade shocks
leading to losses from forward contracts are the reason why forwards exist: they insure
against terms of trade shocks.
This budget constraint also shows that households can not insure fully against terms of
trade risk. Forward contracts refer to a certain amount of goods that can be purchased at
this ﬁxed price pY. As the actual amount of goods consumed depends on the realization pY
t+1
of the price, some uncertainty always remains. This is the crucial departure of our model
from the classic setups in the hedging literature Ethier (1973, pp. 496) and Benninga et al.
(1985, pp. 540). There, ﬁrms decide today in t how much they will produce tomorrow in
t+1. This allows them to fully insure against uncertainty in the price of their output good.
The well-known separation theorem of no uncertainty after hedging results. If our agents
knew how much they will consume tomorrow, full hedging would be possible as well. They
will never know, however, as price uncertainty has an income eﬀect as well.
A no-bankruptcy constraint. In order to avoid insolvency of households, we have to in-
troduce a no-bankruptcy constraint. Our point of departure is the expenditure equation
(9).A sn e g a t i v ee x p e n d i t u r ei sn o tf e a s i b l e ,w ea r g u et h a tt h ew o r s tt h a tc a nh a p p e nt ot h e
budget of our agents is an expenditure of zero,




t+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ − p
Y¢
Dt =0 .
Solving for Dt yields
Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt
(1 + rt+1)χ + pY − pY
t+1
.
Regarding our forward, the most unfavorable situation for households is pY
t+1 =0 . Prudence




(1 + rt+1)χ + pY . (11)
5This condition makes intuitively sense: the greater the contracted price pY and the greater
the costs of forward cover χ, the smaller the amount of forwards the agents are allowed to
buy. Similarly, the greater the interest rate and wage income wt, the greater the amount of
Dt the agents can commit to. Note that the interest rate rt+1 is deterministic and hence
k n o w ni np e r i o dt, since the capital stock is deterministic and there are no technology shocks
in the model. The expression (1 + rt+1)wt then simply gives maximum period t+1income,
computed in period t. The denominator of (11) in turn gives the highest possible costs of
the forward position, evaluated in period t. This ratio gives the number of forwards Dt an
agent can buy such that in the most unfavorable realization of forward prices the agent still
has a non-negative expenditure level.
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
The maximization problem of households
The maximization problem of households consists in choosing the amount Dt of forward con-
tracts and optimal consumption levels CX and CY such that expected utility E[v(u(CX,C Y))]
is maximized, given the budget constraint (9).
Conceptually, maximization can be subdivided into two steps. The second step consists
in allocating consumption expenditure to goods X and Y, taking consumption expenditure
as given. This second sub-problem is solved after realization of terms of trade. It is therefore














These equations hold at each point in time and determine consumption levels after uncer-
tainty has been resolved.

















is indirect utility where con-
sumption levels in the homothetic utility function u(CX,C Y) have been replaced by optimal
consumption levels. Utility u(CX,C Y) can then be written as expenditure divided by the










Φ is a constant. Expenditure is given by (9).
This two-step solution to our maximization problem is made possible by assuming that
consumption takes place only when agents are old. If consumption were to take place in both
periods, the consumption choice in the ﬁrst period would be linked to the saving decision.
T h es y s t e mt h a tw o u l dh a v et ob ea n a l y z e dw o u l db em o r ec o m p l i c a t e d( a sa ni n t e r t e m p o r a l
consumption rule would have to be added).
























where the expectations operator refers to the entire bracket [.]. This condition consists of
two parts. The ﬁrst is marginal utility v0 (.), here expressed in the form of the indirect utility
function. Marginal utility is positive but decreasing in consumption levels, or as stated here,
6increasing in expenditure and decreasing in prices. The denominator of the second term,
pY
t+1−(1 + rt+1)χ−pY, represents the realized nominal return from the forwards. Its expected
value is negative under unbiased (or actuarially fair5)f o r w a r d s ,i . e .i fE[pY
t+1]=pY,s i n c et h e
term (1 + rt+1)χ representing the opportunity costs of entering the forward market enters
negatively. If forwards could be obtained without costs, clearly these opportunity costs would
vanish and unbiased forwards would have an expected nominal return of zero. Dividing the
nominal return by the price index gives the complete second term, the real return of the
forward contract.
Now that the meaning of the two components of (14) is clear, the intuition of this ﬁrst
order condition is more easy to see. The expectations operator is an integral in our case
where terms-of-trade is a continuous random variable. This integral can be split into a
negative and a positive part. As long as pY
t+1 < (1 + rt+1)χ+pY, the realized price is in the
"loss region". Marginal utility is multiplied by a negative number and this interval of the
integral contributes negatively. Concavity of the utility function with respect to the amount
of forwards implies that as long as (14) is negative, the agents have too many forwards and
hence should decrease holdings. On the other hand, as soon as pY
t+1 > (1 + rt+1)χ−pY -t h e
"win region" - marginal utility contributes positively. Again, concavity tells us that as long
as (14) is positive agents should increase holdings of Dt. However, given positive costs to
obtain forward cover, i.e. χ>0,i n c r e a s i n gDt will increase rt, hence opportunity costs will
rise as well, up to a point where marginal utility will fall in Dt. Hence the optimal amount
of Dt i ss u c ht h a tt h ep o s i t i v ea n dt h en e g a t i v ec o m p o n e n t so ft h ei n t e g r a lj u s tb a l a n c e .
Reduced form
The reduced form of the model consists of two equations. The capital stock in the next
period is given by savings today times the number L of individuals and divided by the price
of one unit of capital and is given by (8). With the ﬁrst-period budget constraint (7) giving
individual savings, we obtain
Kt+1 =
pX
t ∂Xt/∂L − χDt
pX L, (15)
w h e r et h ew a g er a t ew a sr e p l a c e db yi t sv a l u em a r g i n a lp r o d u c t(2).
The amount of forward contracts is determined by the ﬁrst order condition (14).C o n -
sumption of the old is given by the current capital stock, interest payments on the current
capital stock plus income (or losses) from forward contracts. Using the budget constraint







t+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ − p
Y¢
Dt. (16)
Equilibrium in our economy is therefore described by equations (14) and (15),g i v e n(16).
These equations determine the two variables Kt and Dt, given an initial capital stock K0.
Equation (15), determining the evolution of capital, shows that next periods capital is
known in t. By contrast, expenditure (16) is uncertain when some forward contracts are
signed. This makes consumption levels of both goods and exports and imports uncertain. If
no forward contracts are signed (D =0 ), expenditure is deterministic, consumption of good
X would be deterministic but consumption of good Y would be stochastic.
7Steady-state
In the steady state, the capital stock is the same in each period. Variables that are constant
are printed without a time subscript. All stochastic variables are denoted by a tilde (~).




and is therefore a deterministic variable. Domestic production (1) is then deterministic as
well, X = F (K,L). Steady state expenditure ˜ e is given from (16) as




Y − (1 + r)χ − p
Y¢
D (18)







P (pX, ˜ pY)
¶
˜ pY − (1 + r)χ − pY




Given the steady state quantities of the capital stock K and forward contracts D as deter-
mined in (17) and (19) with (18), will agents want to hold a positive amount of forwards?
This will be analyzed in the next subsection. In order to obtain an idea about quantitative
predictions, we calibrate the model in the subsequent section and provide numerical results
afterwards. We also perform a comparative static analysis and ﬁnally introduce options as
an alternative to forwards. By deriving several equilibrium properties under options, the
properties of forwards will also become clearer.
The equilibrium demand for forwards
We now present three important results with respect to the existence of interior solutions,
i.e. a positive demand for forwards D in the steady state. For simplicity, we set transaction
cost equal to zero, χ =0 , in what follows. Note that this implies by (17) a capital stock that
is independent of the choice of D. All proofs are in app. 6.1.
Theorem 1 Risk averse agents will not buy forward cover at unbiased prices, i.e. E[˜ pY]=
pY.






], as a function of forwards D, taking expenditure from (18) into
account.6 The ﬁgure shows how expected utility of households depends only on forwards,
provided that they anticipate the choice of consumption levels, and thereby illustrates the
maximization problem of section 3. Since our objective function is globally concave in D
(see app. 6.4), the sign of the ﬁrst derivative of this function with respect to D at the point
D =0determines whether or not there is an interior solution. As plotted above, expected
utility would be maximized at a negative D. Agents therefore do not want to hold forward
contracts.









Figure 1: Expected utility as a function of forwards D
In the light of the existing literature on the topic this result is rather surprising. The
standard result states7 that if an unbiased forward market exists, agents use this market to
avoid all uncertainty, i.e. they obtain full cover for their position. The crucial diﬀerence of
our model to the literature lies in the timing structure. The main body8 of the literature
assumes that all decisions are made before uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, we assume, as
is standard in e.g. stochastic macro models, that although the agents decide on the optimal
amount of forward cover before uncertainty is resolved, their consumption decision is made
after the resolution of the price uncertainty. Under this setup, buying forward contracts
amounts to no less than restricting one’s possibilities to adjust to price realizations. Risk
averse agents will not give away this opportunity. Put diﬀerently, as agents can not fully
insure against terms of trade risk (see the discussion after (10)), a forward contract is basically
a risky asset and the separation theorem fails. It is clear that there are some decisions that
will be made in advance and for this part the analysis of the existing literature would be
appropriate. We believe, however, that most of consumption decisions are made when actual
consumption takes place and prices are known.
Theorem 2 Risk averse agents will only buy forward cover for suﬃciently low pY,i . e .
E[˜ pY] > pY.
Note that this result follows from the ﬁrst theorem. One possible interpretation would be
that if pY is lower than the expected value of the price pY
t+1, the average return of a forward
position will be positive. Thus the agent will be compensated for giving up their possibility
to adjust their consumption bundle according to the price realizations in the next period.
Hence the agents are willing to hold a forward position.




Y ], i.e. the price risk
neutral households would oﬀer, risk averse agents will buy forward contracts.9
To illustrate the third result, imagine a ﬁgure similar to ﬁgure 1 for risk-neutral house-








the slope of the expected utility at D =0is zero. The slope of expected indirect utility at
this point D =0can be expressed, for any given value of pY, as a function of the degree of
risk aversion. Theorem 3 essentially states that the more risk averse agents are, the larger
9the slope becomes. Hence, moving from risk neutrality, i.e. σ =1 , to risk aversion is equiv-
alent to shifting the whole graph to the right. This in turn implies that the forward price
pY at which the risk neutral agents are just indiﬀerent between buying and selling induces a
positive demand by any risk averse agent.
Note that these results may be somewhat surprising, given the ”full-hedge theorem” -
as in Ethier (1973) or Kawai and Zilcha (1986) - we normally encounter in the literature.
The reason for this is that our model diﬀers from the usual models such that agents always
face uncertainty through the price-index channel, whereas in the former models there is the
possibility to avoid all uncertainty, for agents completely decide upon their plans in period
one. Risk averse agents do not want to lose the ability to adjust to price shocks in the next
period, whereas risk neutral agents are indiﬀerent towards this opportunity.
Secondly, we have another factor at work here. By buying forward contracts the agents
trade one risk against the other. Holding a forward position means that risk now directly
aﬀects nominal income. This can be easily seen from (9). Risk aversion regarding nominal
income and the uncertainty through the price-index channel are the reasons for the agents
asking for more than unbiased forwards.







Figure 2: The indirect utility function which is convex in pY
The convexity of the indirect utility function with respect to the prices is illustrated in
ﬁgure 2. It shows indirect utility as a function of the foreign price. Convexity of indirect
utility with respect to prices implies that agents prefer any linear combination of prices to
the average of this linear combination. Hence, agents are in fact risk-lovers with respect to
period two price uncertainty. Note that this result entirely hinges on the timing assumption
of the consumption decision.
Calibrating the model
We will now calibrate our model as this allows us to provide quantitative results in the next
subsection and perform a comparative static analysis subsequently. We begin with discussing
the chosen values. Solving the model numerically involves computing values of both D and
K which satisfy (17) and simultaneously (19). To get numerical results, we need to specify
a couple of parameters and the underlying distribution. As far as possible, this is achieved
by drawing on real world data.










Table 1: Parameter values used for calibrating
10As a ﬁrst step, we specify the production technology by a Cobb-Douglas form, X (K,L)=
SKβL1−β. The scale parameter for the technology, S, is set to one. Equation (17) depends
on various parameters: PX is the price of the numeraire good and can thus be set to one.
Transaction costs for forwards are captured by χ in our setup. One could think of χ as
including some kind of market price of the forward contract or of obtaining forward cover.
These two concepts are in fact quite diﬀerent. In reality, the market price of the forward
cover is quite small, whereas the real costs of obtaining forward cover may very well be
substantial.10 This leaves some room for determining the value of χ and thus we will set this
value arbitrarily, but close to zero. In our calibration we use 1/100. The size of the popula-
tion, as the TFP measure S, is just a scale parameter and therefore no further elaboration
is necessary. We set L =1 0 0 . The output elasticity β in our production function reﬂects
relative shares of capital and labour and is commonly found, e.g. Maddison, 1987, p. 658,
to be around 0.3.
The second reduced form equation (19) and (18) require the speciﬁcation of some para-
meters as well. Depreciation is assumed to be 2.5% per year. With one period representing
30 years in our two-period OLG setup, we have δ =0 .54.11 The price pY is determined by











Equation (20) is determined by using the ﬁrst order condition (19), setting σ =1and
solving for pY (see app. 6.1). The parameter of the utility function, α, determines the share
of domestic in total consumption. Using data from ’Statistisches Bundesamt’, the empirically
observed share of foreign products in total consumption in Germany is approximately 0.8.
To determine the most appropriate distribution, we obtained monthly price index data for
both import prices and export prices over the period January 1962 until January 2002,
leaving us with 482 observations. Dividing the import index by the export index amounts,
in terms of our model, to obtaining the price series pY
t . The shape of the histogram suggested
choosing a lognormal distribution, which is an assumption commonly made, for example in
the ﬁnance literature.13 T h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h ed i s t r i b u t ion were obtained by maximum
likelihood estimation.14 The estimates were
Distribution E[˜ pY] E[˜ pY]2
lognormal 0.1149 0.0071
underlying normal 1.1261 0.0103
Table 2: Parameters of the lognormal and the underlying normal distribution
A numerical solution
We now present a simulation result for a small country. Under lognormal distributed price
uncertainty, using the parameter speciﬁcation we presented above, we found that the econ-
omy will buy a total amount of 1.62 units of forward contracts, given the price risk neutral
agents would oﬀer. The capital stock and thus GDP of the economy can be calculated and
using the mean on the distribution as the realization of the price in period two, the economy
will import 9.5 units of good Y . This means that the forward cover to import ratio is in this
case approximately 17%. This is in accordance to surveys on the topic. For example Carse
et al. (1980) found that ﬁrms that import or export and thus face terms of trade risk, only
cover between 15-30% of their open positions.
11Some caveats are in order here. First, the actual terms of trade variance may well be
underestimated with our proxy used. If this is true, the calculated amount of forwards is too
high as well. Second, the costs of forwards we used are to some degree arbitrary. They are,
however, close to the actual transaction fees charged by banks but would not incorporate
such items as information costs and ﬁxed costs for setting up the appropriate institutions,
letting alone deliberation costs. To the extent to which the actual costs are higher, our
result overestimates the amount of forwards purchased. Third, there is the issue of the
degree of risk aversion with respect to wealth. In the literature there is no consensus on
that parameter. We choose to set this parameter, 1 − σ in our model, to 1/2,w h i c hi sa
conservative choice in the sense that a broad range of publications support this choice. It also
turns out that this particular parameter is the least inﬂuential in altering our results. Lastly,
our result is to some extent related to the literature on international portfolio diversiﬁcation,
i.e. the home bias puzzle in equity holdings. Baxter and Jerman (1997) argues that in order
to explain actual portfolio holdings quantitatively, one needs to consider multiple sources
of uncertainty. Recently, however, other contributions - see as an example Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2000) who consider trade costs as the relevant explanation for the observed home
bias in equity holdings - have relied on a more parsimonious speciﬁcation with only one
source of uncertainty. We follow here the more parsimonious approach. The aforementioned
qualiﬁcations notwithstanding, this numerical exercise recapitulates our analytical results
and shows that the model is able to ﬁt the actual data for reasonable parameter values.
Comparative statics
There are a couple of interesting questions arising when changing the parameters. We begin
with the terms of trade variance. If there is an exogenously induced increase in the variance of
the foreign price, we observe a fall in the demand for forwards. At our calculated equilibrium
point, we observe a decrease of 4.7% in demand for forwards if we increase the variance by
1%. This is accordance with the intuition for our results. Risk averse agents are not willing
to give up the possibility to adjust themselves to a terms of trade shock. The greater the
likelihood of a terms of trade shock, the more they have to be compensated for holding
forward contracts.
Next consider the costs of the forwards. If costs decrease, demand will increase. At the
point of our interior solution a 1% decrease in the costs would induce a 16% rise in the
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Figure 3: Comparative static results
12Lastly we look at the degree of risk aversion. A society which is more risk averse than
another will demand less forward cover than the less risk averse society. A 1% increase of
the degree of risk aversion, i.e. a 1% fall in σ, reduces demand for forwards by 0.4%.
The comparative static results are summarized in Figure 3. An increase in the variance of
pY, an increase in the costs χ a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o nw i l lc e t e r i sp a r i b u s
decrease the demand for forward cover by shifting the schedule implied by (14) downwards.
Note that in the case of changing costs χ, the capital schedule will also shift.
Options
In order to give additional insights into the workings of our model, we will in this section
examine what the optimal hedging behavior would be if the agents could buy options instead
of forward contracts to insure against the uncertainty regarding the price of the foreign good.
A (call) option, as opposed to a forward contract, does not oblige to buy the underlying asset
(or commodity), instead the buyer can choose whether or not he will exercise his option.
Keeping our notation, we can extend our model very easily to model an option instead of
a forward contract by observing that in the event pY
t ≤ pY, the buyer of that option would
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Dt now denotes the amount of options instead of forward contracts, the strike price being
pY. By buying one option for the price χ, an agent is entitled to buy one unit of good Y in












































where PY is the cumulative density function of pY
t+1. T h r e er e s u l t se m e r g ef o rt h es t e a d y
state (see app. 6.3).
Theorem 4 If options are costless, i.e. χ =0 , the optimal amount is inﬁnity, D = ∞.
This is probably the most straightforward result. Rational agents, being oﬀered a free
lunch, will happily accept this. Here the free lunch comes as a free lottery ticket, without any
risk of loosing. We present this otherwise not very surprising result to make the structure of
the decision problem clearer.
Theorem 5 If agents can choose between options and forwards at the same costs, they will
always choose options.
To facilitate the comparison between forwards and options, we present the second result.
It constitutes, again, a standard property of the utility function of the agents. Forwards will
always be dominated by options, as long as the price is the same for both.
These two theorems imply that we can replicate the real-world coexistence of options
and forwards in our model. This necessitates that either forwards cost less or are more than
unbiased (or both).
13Theorem 6 Let transaction costs for options be given by χ. If options are unbiased, i.e.
E[˜ pY]=pY, agents will demand a positive amount of options.
Our last results highlights again the diﬀerence between forwards and options. In contrast
to forward contracts there exist a positive demand, depending on the price χ,o f" u n b i a s e d
options", that is options that have a strike price that equals the expected value of the price
in the next period.
5C o n c l u s i o n
One largely debated issue in international economics is the question whether or not volatility
in exchange rates and terms of trade depresses trade levels. There is an extensive literature
on that question, both theoretical and empirical. The main body of the theoretical literature
claims that terms of trade and/or exchange rate uncertainty does not matter as long as well
developed forward and futures markets exist. This literature further predicts that agents
fully hedge the existing risks. The empirical work done in this ﬁeld fails to unambiguously
support these ﬁndings.
We model a small open economy that is subject to terms of trade risk originating entirely
from abroad. Agents can buy forward contracts to insure against this uncertainty but can
adjust consumption bundles after terms of trade have realized. This small departure from the
standard assumption in the hedging literature where consumption can not be adjusted after
resolution of uncertainty implies that forward contracts turn into an asset. When forward
contracts are unbiased, there is no demand for terms of trade insurance, a direct eﬀect of the
convexity of the indirect utility function with respect to prices. Risk aversion with respect
to consumption levels and expenditure levels is not a suﬃcient motive to buy forwards. We
derive conditions under which, on part of the risk averters, a positive demand for forwards
exists. Again, this demand does not stem from hedging but purely from investment motives.
We calibrate our model with data for Germany to obtain numerical solutions. The
equilibrium amount of forwards contracted in relation to the equilibrium amount of imports
closely resembles the empirical observed values, thus providing a rationale for the apparent
underhedging of domestic agents against price level and/or exchange rate uncertainty. The
reason for low hedging lies again in the asset-nature of forwards: As returns for forwards
should be lower than returns for e.g. capital, few futures will be held and hedging is low.
We also showed that options, in contrast to forwards, will be bought as means of insurance.
At unbiased prices, options strictly dominate forward contracts. This may help explain why
the market for options has grown exponentially over the last decade or so.
The main contribution of our analysis, however, is that the ”price-convexity” eﬀect should
be incorporated in the existing models, which could be achieved by giving up the assump-
tion that all plans are irrevocably made in the period which precedes the resolution of the
uncertainty. This should alter dramatically the strong theoretical predictions of this litera-
ture with respect to forward markets and should thus provide a better understanding of the
eﬀects at work here. Since forwards are unattractive and options perhaps too expensive, our
analysis may also provide an additional argument in favour of international capital ﬂows,
and hence capital account liberalization, as a means of insuring the economy.
Our work can be extended in some promising ways. First, to understand the implications
of covariance eﬀects so often at work in the hedging process money and thus a nominal ex-
change rate could be brought into the model. This would also allow a comparison between
14our modeling approach and the existing literature that has proceeded with considering mul-
tiple sources of risk. Another interesting extension would be to explicitly study the eﬀect
of heterogeneity in risk-aversion. This would allow to endogenize the forward price pY and
thereby to conﬁrm (as we would expect) that returns on forwards as assets are low. This
would strengthen our explanation that trade coverage is low because forwards are assets.
6 Appendix
All further computations are contained in a Referees’ appendix which is available at
www.waelde.com/publications.html
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Notes
1We are indebted to a Referee for many useful comments that considerably helped to improve the paper.
Jens Eisenschmidt: Department of Economics, University of Giessen, 35394 Giessen, Germany. Phone
+49.641.99-22112, Fax +49.641.99-22119. Klaus Wälde: Department of Economics, University of Würzburg,
97070 Würzburg, Germany, klaus@waelde.com, http://www.waelde.com, Phone + 49.931.31-2950, Fax +
49.931.888-7025.
2In contrast to the majority of the literature on that topic, households demand forwards, not ﬁrms. This,
however, simply follows from the general equlibrium setup we use. Firms are owned by the households, who
look ”through” them. A similar argument is made in Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998, pp. 18).
3If, in contrast, Dt represented options, domestic agents would not be obliged to buy and thus only draw
on the contract in favorable situations. This will be analysed in section 4.
4We are grateful to one Referee who pointed out that our setup is similar to an endowment economy:
The endowment is given by the wage wt and agents decide whether to transfer this endowment into the next
period by holding capital or buying forward contracts.
5In the literature, actuarially fair refers to a situation where the expected pay-oﬀ of an insurance is equal
to the insurance premium (Kreps, 1990, p. 92 or Dixit, 1990, p. 124). Unbiasedness usually describes a
(statistical) property of the forward price, i.e. E[pY ]=pY (Zilcha and Broll, 1992, p. 475 or Viaene and
Zilcha, 1998, p. 594). As we do not explicitly model how the forward price pY is determined, we use the
expression unbiasedness. Note, however, that the two concepts would be identical if we assumed that the
forward price is the outcome of competition among perfectly competitive ﬁrms and χ are opportunity cost
of buyers of insurance (e.g. shipping cost) and not risk-premia for the insurer.
6All numerical results were obtained by using Mathematica. The ﬁles are available upon request.
7See, inter alia, Ethier (1973), Benninga et al. (1985), Kawai and Zilcha (1986), Eldor and Zilcha (1987),
Viaene and de Vries (1992), Zilcha and Broll (1992), Viaene and Zilcha (1998) and Adam-Müller (2000).
8There are a few papers that discuss the theoretical possibility of a diﬀerent timing structure, an example
being Perée and Steinherr (1989). We are, however, not aware of any work that explicitely models this.
169Strictly speaking, we should write
¡
pY ¢α. To simplify notation, we use pα
Y and deviate from our conven-
tion of indicating the type of the good with superscripts.
10Think of a ﬁrm which has to hire expertise to contract such cover and thus may have substantial costs.
In terms of transfers, the χDs, think of margin requirements.
11This follows from (1 − 0.025)
30 ≈ 0,46. Hence 46% of the capital stock remains and 54% are lost after
30 years of constant annual depreciation of 2,5%.
12As stated in the model section, ¯ pY is exogenously given by international markets. We use this equation
to ﬁnd a plausible value for ¯ pY . It does not mean that ¯ pY is endogenous in our model.
13The Black-Scholes formula relies on lognormality of prices. Even in international macro this assumption
is often used, see for example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998).
14We use R and the function ﬁtdistr which is included in the MASS package.
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